Olivia Gibson, Christina Harward, Daria Novikov, Grace Mappes, Jessica Sobieski,
and Frederick W. Kagan
June 26, 2025, 5:30pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.
Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:15am ET on June 26. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 27 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
South Korean intelligence suggests that North Korea may deploy North Korean troops to Ukrainian territory, which would represent a significant battlefield inflection. Reuters, citing a South Korean lawmaker privy to intelligence from South Korea’s National Intelligence Service (NIS), reported on June 26 that North Korea may deploy an unspecified number of additional North Korean forces to Russia to fight against Ukraine as early as July or August 2025 and that North Korea continues to arm Russia with artillery ammunition and missiles.[1] The South Korean lawmaker told Reuters that the NIS assessed that Russia may be preparing to initiate a large-scale assault against Ukraine in July or August 2025 and that North Korea is likely receiving technical advice from Russia on satellite launches and missile guidance systems in return. ISW has observed evidence of North Korean forces augmenting Russian forces in Kursk Oblast and North Korea supplying Russia with artillery ammunition and ballistic missiles.[2] Ukrainian forces maintain a limited presence in Kursk Oblast, so North Korean personnel participating in combat operations would most likely be fighting in Ukrainian territory.[3] The North Korean and Russian military commands authorizing the deployment of North Korean forces to Ukrainian territory would mark a significant battlefield inflection that may improve Russian forces’ ability to sustain simultaneous offensive operations in multiple directions, which the Russian military has traditionally struggled to conduct.[4] ISW previously assessed that Russian forces compensated by conducting pulsing, more contained, offensive operations along different sectors of the frontline, but recent reporting indicates that Russian forces appear to be gradually advancing in at least three simultaneous large-scale offensive operations in the Borova-Lyman, Kostyantynivka, and Novopavlivka directions.[5] It is not possible to forecast the likely impact of North Korean support of this type without more information about the size and composition of the North Korean troop contingent that would be going to Ukraine, nor is it clear how rapidly new North Korean troops would become effective in operations alongside Russian troops in Ukraine.
US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met at the NATO summit on June 25 and discussed possible US sales of Patriot air defense systems to Ukraine and joint weapons production. Trump stated that he and Zelensky did not talk about a possible ceasefire in Ukraine during the meeting, but that Trump may talk to Russian President Vladimir Putin in the near future about a ceasefire.[6] Zelensky stated that he reiterated during the meeting that Ukraine supports the US position on a ceasefire.[7] Zelensky stated that he and Trump discussed the increase in the number of “massive” Russian strikes against Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure and people, and Trump stated that the United States “should consider” selling Patriot air defense systems and missiles to Ukraine as Ukraine’s supply is limited.[8] Trump and Zelensky agreed to continue talks about strengthening Ukraine’s air defense with European partners. Trump and Zelensky also discussed possible joint production of drones and electronic warfare (EW) equipment.[9] Zelensky stated in April 2025 that Ukraine proposed to the United States that Ukraine purchase “30 to 50 billion” (likely USD) worth of air defense and weapons systems from the United States and that Ukraine is prepared to purchase these systems itself — either through direct payment to the United States or through the fund established by the US-Ukrainian minerals deal.[10] Zelensky had stated that Ukraine will consider the provision of at least 10 air defense systems to Ukraine as a “security guarantee.” US Patriot air defense systems are vital to Ukraine’s ability to defend against Russian ballistic missile strikes and will become increasingly important as Russia is reportedly increasing its production and stockpile of ballistic missiles, which would enable larger and more frequent ballistic missile strikes against Ukraine.[11] ISW continues to assess that a strong Ukrainian military backed by Western security guarantees remains the most vital component of a stable post-war European security architecture, guaranteeing a sustainable peace in Ukraine and deterring future Russian aggression.[12]
Kremlin officials continue to platform bellicose rhetoric aimed at undermining Western support for Ukraine and to demonstrate Russia’s uncompromising position on Ukraine. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko claimed on June 25 at the Organization for Security and Cooperation (OSCE) conference that the West is adopting “hostile policies and military planning…that could explode from any spark.”[13] Glushko further claimed that new Western military aid packages “fuel” the war in Ukraine.[14] The Kremlin regularly promotes rhetoric that is designed to pressure the West into making decisions that benefit Russia, such as refraining from providing further assistance to Ukraine, in response to the fact that sustained Western aid has allowed Ukrainian forces to impose significant challenges on Russian forces in Ukraine and threatens Russia’s ability to achieve its war aims.[15]
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin reiterated on June 26 Russia’s long-standing demand that Ukraine commit to an official non-aligned status and claimed that NATO violated promises from the early 1990s to refrain from expanding eastward.[16] Russia has consistently demanded that Ukraine commit to a neutral, non-aligned status, which would require Ukraine to amend its constitution and NATO to fundamentally alter its open-door policy.[17] The Kremlin continues to signal its unyielding demands and disinterest in peace, further indicating that Russia will very likely continue to pursue efforts to prolong negotiations in an attempt to extract additional concessions and secure additional gains on the battlefield.[18] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin will continue to protract the negotiation process so long as Russian leadership maintains the position that Russian forces can outlast Ukraine’s defense capabilities and Western support for Ukraine.[19]
Satellite imagery of select armored vehicle repair plants in Russia indicates that Russia continues to rely on refurbishing its Soviet-era stores of armored vehicles. A social media source tracking equipment at Russian military depots and repair facilities via satellite imagery shared on June 26 an updated analysis of Russian Armor Repair Plants (BTRZs) that repair damaged armored vehicles and refurbish stored vehicles and stated that most armored fighting vehicle (AFVs) that Russia is taking from storage are no longer in good enough condition to immediately deploy to the front without refurbishment, as Russia was able to do at the start of the war.[20] The source estimated that the 81st BTRZ in Armavir, Krasnodar Krai, which repairs and modernizes stored BTR-70/80 armored personnel carriers (APCs) and likely also repairs damaged BTRs from the battlefield, has likely been refurbishing up to 200 BTR-70/80/82 APCs annually since 2023.[21] The source estimated that the 144th BTRZ in Yekaterinburg, Sverdlovsk Oblast, which is the only BTRZ that refurbishes older BMD infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) and also repairs BMP-2 and BMD-2 IFVs, has likely been annually refurbishing between 100 to 150 BMD-2 IFVs and BTR-D APCs since an unspecified year.[22]
The source estimated that the Arzamas Mechanical Plant in Arzamas, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast, likely annually produces over 500 BTR-82 APCs but noted that satellite imagery showing a growing pile of hulls at the plant suggests that the plant is either increasing production rates or also does repairs of damaged BTRs.[23] The source noted that Arzamas’ production numbers are unclear but are likely high due to the high number of BTR-80/82s that Russian forces are losing in Ukraine and how quickly Russian forces are replenishing these vehicles.[24] The source also estimated that armored vehicle manufacturer Kurganmashzavod in Kurgan, Kurgan Oblast, likely annually produces 100 to 120 BMD-4M IFVs, roughly 360 BMP-3 IFVs, and 20 to 30 BTR-MDM APCs.[25]
Russia has maintained its offensive operations throughout the war by tapping into its Soviet-era stocks of armored vehicles to compensate for high loss rates, but this resource is finite and approaching a point of diminishing availability.[26] Russian forces have been increasingly using motorcycles and buggies in place of armored vehicles along the frontline in Ukraine due to high Russian vehicle losses in late 2023 and 2024.[27] The British International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) estimated in February 2025 that Russian forces lost over 3,700 IFVs and APCs in 2024 alone.[28] It remains unclear whether Russia’s reliance on motorcycles and buggies will be sufficient to offset these losses in the medium- to long-term.
Ukraine and Russia conducted the seventh prisoner of war (POW) exchange, in accordance with the June 2 Istanbul agreements. Ukrainian officials and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) confirmed that Ukraine and Russia exchanged an unspecified number of severely wounded and sick POWs as well as those under 25 years old on June 26.[29] Ukrainian officials reported that Russia captured a majority of the released Ukrainian POWs in 2022.
Key Takeaways:
- South Korean intelligence suggests that North Korea may deploy North Korean troops to Ukrainian territory, which would represent a significant battlefield inflection.
- US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met at the NATO summit on June 25 and discussed possible US sales of Patriot air defense systems to Ukraine and joint weapons production.
- Kremlin officials continue to platform bellicose rhetoric aimed at undermining Western support for Ukraine and to demonstrate Russia’s uncompromising position on Ukraine.
- Satellite imagery of select armored vehicle repair plants in Russia indicates that Russia continues to rely on refurbishing its Soviet-era stores of armored vehicles.
- Ukraine and Russia conducted the seventh prisoner of war (POW) exchange, in accordance with the June 2 Istanbul agreements.
- Ukrainian forces advanced near Novopavlivka. Russian forces advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Toretsk.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Fighting continued in Kursk Oblast on June 26.
Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on June 25 and 26.[30] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked near Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo) and Novyi Put (east of Tetkino).[31]
Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)
Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 26 indicates that Russian forces recently seized Andriivka (north of Sumy City) and advanced southeast of Oleksiivka (northeast of Sumy City).[32]
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces recently advanced near Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy City).[33]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Sumy City near Yablunivka and Yunakivka.[34] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked north of Sumy City near Oleksiivka and Novomykolaivka and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka, Yablunivka, and Sadky.[35]
Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on June 26 that Ukrainian forces have repelled the Russian summer offensive in the Sumy Oblast border area and stabilized the frontline “as of this week.”[36] Syrskyi stated that Ukrainian offensive operations in Glushkovsky Raion, Kursk Oblast forced the Russian military command to divert forces that would otherwise take part in the Sumy Oblast offensive and that Ukrainian forces have pinned about 50,000 Russian military personnel total in the Kursk and North Slobozhansk (northern Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts) directions. ISW has observed geolocated evidence indicating that Ukrainian forces have regained territory north and northeast of Sumy City in recent weeks as the pace of Russian advances in the border area has slowed.[37]
Ukraine’s Siversk (Northern) Group of Forces Spokesperson Vadym Mysnyk stated on June 26 that Russian forces are most active in northern Sumy Oblast and have decreased their use of all-terrain vehicles (ATV)s in assaults and rely on infantry assaults.[38]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Smuglyanka Detachment are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[39] Elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF]), including its 382nd and elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), the 83rd Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade, and the 106th VDV Division are reportedly operating in northern Sumy Oblast.[40] Drone operators of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly conducting reconnaissance near Andriivka (north of Sumy City).[41]
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on June 26 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced toward Vovchanski Khutory (northeast of Kharkiv City).[42]
Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City near Lyptsi and Hlyboke and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Vovchanski Khutory, and Zybyne on June 25 and 26.[43] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces recently counterattacked in the Vovchansk and Lyptsi directions.[44]
A servicemember of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Vovchansk direction reported on June 26 that intense fighting continues in the Vovchansk direction and that Russian forces continue to conduct motorized assaults of three to five personnel on motorcycles.[45] The servicemember stated that Russian forces have recently begun operating “mother drones” – large drones that carry multiple smaller first-person-view (FPV) drones — to fly to positions in the Ukrainian rear and allow Russian forces to launch and conduct strikes with the smaller FPV drones out of range of Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems.
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian “Anvar” Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 “Anvar” volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Sosnivka (north of Kharkiv City).[46]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on June 26 but did not advance.
Russian forces conducted ground assaults north of Kupyansk near Holubivka, Mala Shapkivka, and Kindrashivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Kamyanka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka on June 25 and 26.[47]
Ukrainian National Guard Spokesperson Colonel Ruslan Muzychuk stated on June 26 that Russian forces are attempting to expand a bridgehead on the west (right) bank of the Oskil River, especially near Dvorichna (northeast of Kupyansk), Pishchane (southeast of Kupyansk), and “Kolisnyky” – likely meaning Kolisnykivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[48]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on June 26 but did not advance.
Russian forces conducted ground operations northeast of Borova near Nova Kruhlyakivka; east of Borova near Nadiya, Kopanky, and Zelenyi Hai; and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and toward Olhivka on June 25 and 26.[49]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on June 26 but did not make any confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked and seized western Ridkodub (north of Lyman).[50] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Hlushchenkove (north of Lyman) and reached the outskirts of the settlement, advanced south of Lypove (north of Lyman), and advanced north and southwest of Zelena Dolyna (north of Lyman).[51]
Russian forces conducted ground assaults north of Lyman near Novyi Myr and Ridkodub and toward Zelena Dolyna; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi; and east of Lyman toward Torske on June 25 and 26.[52] A Russian source claimed on June 26 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Zelena Dolyna and Kolodyazi.[53]
The commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Lyman direction reported on June 26 that Russian forces are using guided glide bombs and first-person view (FPV) drones to target Ukrainian logistics centers and drone pilots on the front lines as well as concentrations of personnel and recreation areas.[54]
A Russian milblogger claimed that commanders in the 3rd Combined Arms Army (CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) continue to submit false reports exaggerating Russian successes in the area, a common complaint in this section of the front.[55]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating between Karpivka and Lypove (both north of Lyman).[56] Elements of the Russian 488th Motorized Rifle Regiment and the 283rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (both 144th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating in Ridkodub.[57]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on June 26 but did not advance.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske on June 25 and 26.[58]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on June 26 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in southern Chasiv Yar.[59]
Russian forces conducted offensive operations in Chasiv Yar itself, north of Chasiv Yar toward Markove, and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky and toward Bila Hora on June 25 and 26.[60]
Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Stupochky, and elements of the 98th VDV Division’s 217th and 331st VDV regiments are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[61]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 25 and 26 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Toretsk and northwest of Yablunivka (northwest of Toretsk), respectively.[62]
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Dyliivka (north of Toretsk).[63]
Russian forces continued offensive operations near Toretsk itself, north of Toretsk near Dyliivka and toward Oleksandro-Shultyne; and northwest of Toretsk near Nelipivka and toward Oleksandro-Kalynove, Yablunivka, Rusyn Yar, and Poltavka on June 25 and 26.[64]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on June 26 but did not make any confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed on June 25 that Russian forces advanced east of Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[65]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Pokrovsk near Malynivka, Myrne, and Shevchenko Pershe; east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka, Promin, and Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove and Udachne on June 25 and 26.[66]
The commander of a Ukrainian tank battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on June 26 that Russian forces continue assaults with small fireteams of one to two soldiers and sometimes operate on motorcycles, all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), and buggies.[67] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces are constantly attacking in the Pokrovsk direction and have adapted tactics to leverage increased cover from foliage.[68] An officer of a Ukrainian unmanned systems detachment operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces only field heavy equipment when attempting to advance in a specific area.[69]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 15th and 30th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 2nd Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating near Udachne.[70] Drone operators of the “Typhoon” detachment of the 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[71] Elements of the 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[72]
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.
Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 26 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced north of Peredubova (south of Novopavlivka).[73]
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Perebudova, north of Novoserhiivka, northeast of Novomykolaivka (both northeast of Novopavlivka), southwest of Horikhove, north of Yalta (both southeast of Novopavlivka, and southwest of Fedorivka (south of Novopavlivka).[74]
Russian forces continued ground attacks northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka, Novomykolaivka, and Muravka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Oleksiivka, Novoukrainka, Horikhove, Bahatyr, and Odradne; south of Novopavlivka near Zirka, Yalta, Zaporizhzhia, Fedorivka, Perebudova, Myrne, and Piddubne and on June 25 and 26.[75]
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on June 26 that Russian forces seized Novoserhiivka.[76] ISW assesses that Russian forces seized Novoserhiivka as of June 24.[77]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade are reportedly operating near Zirka.[78] Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) and 30th Separate Spetsnaz Company (reportedly of the 36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Myrne.[79]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on June 26 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Shevchenko and northwest of Vilne Pole (both northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[80]
Russian forces continued ground assaults northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Shevchenko and Vilne Pole and toward Voskresenka and Maliivka, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on June 25 and 26.[81]
The Russian MoD claimed on June 26 that Russian forces seized Shevchenko, which ISW assessed that Russian forces seized as of June 21.[82] Russian sources credited elements of the 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) with participating in the seizure of Shevchenko.[83] One Russian milblogger claimed on June 26 that Russian forces advanced within Shevchenko but have not yet seized the settlement.[84]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the “Gnom” (Gnome) squad of the Russian 143rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in the Velyka Novosilka direction.[85]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)
Russian forces continued limited assaults east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka on June 26 but did not make any confirmed advances.[86]
Unconfirmed claims: Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov claimed on June 26 that Russian forces are advancing to central Malynivka.[87]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast southwest of Orikhiv toward Novoandriivka on June 26 but did not advance.[88]
A servicemember of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Zaporizhia direction reported that Russian forces are conducting assaults during the day and night and that Russian commanders are ordering Russian forces to temporarily seize positions on the outskirts of settlements for footage of the soldiers planting flags rather than secure footholds and enduring positions.[89]
Russian forces continued limited assaults in the Kherson direction on June 26 but did not advance.[90]
Ukrainian National Guard Spokesperson Colonel Ruslan Muzychuk reported on June 26 that Russian forces remain focused on conducting reconnaissance and controlling the Dnipro River Delta islands.[91]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 25 to 26. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 41 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk and Kursk cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[92] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down eight drones and that 16 drones were “lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones struck Donetsk and Kharkiv oblasts.[93]
Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko reported that Russian forces are first conducting strikes with swarms of Shahed drones before striking the area with ballistic missiles.[94]
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/north-korea-may-send-more-troops-russia-july-or-august-ukraine-war-seoul-says-2025-06-26/ ; https://archive.ph/xSGXi
[2] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-16-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-16-2025
[3] https://isw.pub/UkrWar052125 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042625 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062425 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062325
[4] https://isw.pub/UkrWar052525 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040825
[5] https://isw.pub/UkrWar062225
[6] https://suspilne dot media/1051589-zelenskij-rozpoviv-pro-detali-zustric-iz-trampom-pid-cas-samitu-nato/
[7] https://www.president.gov dot ua/news/u-gaazi-volodimir-zelenskij-proviv-zustrich-iz-donaldom-tram-98653
[8] https://suspilne dot media/1051589-zelenskij-rozpoviv-pro-detali-zustric-iz-trampom-pid-cas-samitu-nato/
[9] https://suspilne dot media/1051589-zelenskij-rozpoviv-pro-detali-zustric-iz-trampom-pid-cas-samitu-nato/; https://www.president.gov dot ua/news/u-gaazi-volodimir-zelenskij-proviv-zustrich-iz-donaldom-tram-98653
[10] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041025
[11] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-25-2025
[12] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-10-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031125
[13] https://ria dot ru/20250625/grushko-2025448197.html
[14] https://tass dot ru/politika/24356843
[15] https://isw.pub/UkrWar030125 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar04172025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061925; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051725
[16] https://iz dot ru/1910775/2025-06-26/v-mid-rf-nastaivaiut-na-iuridicheskoi-fiksatcii-vneblokovogo-statusa-ukrainy
[17] https://isw.pub/UkrWar052825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051725 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051525 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051425 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051125
[18] https://isw.pub/UkrWar060225 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060125 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-29-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052825
[19] https://isw.pub/UkrWar022125 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030225 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051625
[20] https://x.com/Jonpy99/status/1937969796319961593; https://x.com/Jonpy99/status/1937969805581291862; https://x.com/Jonpy99/status/1937969809418772703
[21] https://x.com/Jonpy99/status/1937969835851309261; https://x.com/Jonpy99/status/1937969843124486214; https://x.com/Jonpy99/status/1937969846274179173;
[22] https://x.com/Jonpy99/status/1937969923776520358; https://x.com/Jonpy99/status/1937969863068156088
[23] https://x.com/Jonpy99/status/1937969857162568159; https://x.com/Jonpy99/status/1937969859943674130
[24] https://x.com/Jonpy99/status/1937969854948250011
[25] https://x.com/Jonpy99/status/1937969983537000573; https://x.com/Jonpy99/status/1937970003619295446
[26] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage
[27] https://isw.pub/UkrWar061625
[28] https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/military-balance/2025/02/combat-losses-and-manpower-challenges-underscore-the-importance-of-mass-in-ukraine/
[29] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/26/prezydent-povidomyv-pro-novyj-obmin-bilshist-zvilnenyh-zahysnykiv-buly-u-poloni-z-2022-roku/ ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/14871 ; https://t.me/Koord_shtab/13388 ; https://suspilne dot media/1048199-obmin-polonenimi-miz-ukrainou-ta-rf-vidbuvsa-novij-etap/ ; https://t.me/mod_russia/54179 ; https://www.facebook.com/rustemumerov.ua/videos/702717725720789/?rdid=Ao1eRFbsDxHIQbFz#
[30] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25915; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25898; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25895
[31] https://t.me/dva_majors/74172; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37766; https://t.me/wargonzo/27506; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30458
[32] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9468; https://t.me/wild_hornets/3146; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30448; https://t.me/wargonzo/27506
[33] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37754; https://t.me/dva_majors/74172
[34] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37754
[35] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30448; https://t.me/dva_majors/74172
[36] https://t.me/osirskiy/1196 ; https://www.facebook.com/CinCAFofUkraine/posts/pfbid02YGoRCNXm2i2zWddYosSei5NGN7VHR5VCGu77gaMTzZKPB8ZzziyiJ7mcyBan1ajQl ; https://t.me/istories_media/9858; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-has-failed-break-ukraine
[37] https://isw.pub/UkrWar062325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061925
[38] https://suspilne dot media/sumy/1052173-armia-rf-namagaetsa-prorvatisa-u-bik-sum-otuv-siversk/
[39] https://t.me/dva_majors/74195
[40] https://t.me/ua_dshv/6167 ; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1938184588737515919 ; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1938186659939455225; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94532; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30455
[41] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/170337
[42] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30468
[43] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25915; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25898; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25895; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/26/na-kytajskyh-motoczyklah-u-suprovodi-droniv-matok-taktyka-rosiyan-na-vovchanskomu-napryamku/
[44] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30468
[45] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/26/na-kytajskyh-motoczyklah-u-suprovodi-droniv-matok-taktyka-rosiyan-na-vovchanskomu-napryamku/
[46] https://t.me/epoddubny/23911
[47] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25898; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25898; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25895
[48] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/26/mriye-forsuvaty-oskil-ta-bigaye-lisamy-protyvnyk-demonstruye-vidnosnu-stabilnist/
[49] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25915; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25898; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25895; https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/27786
[50] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30476; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37767
[51] https://t.me/yurasumy/23719; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37758; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30476; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37756
[52] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25915; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25898; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25895; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37758
[53] https://t.me/tass_agency/322543
[54] https://armyinform.com.ua/2025/06/26/pihotynecz-aktyvuye-tamaru-myhajlivnu-poblyzu-lymanu-rosijski-komandyry-bezzhalni-do-svoyih-soldativ/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qbwH1G_vZM0
[55] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-30-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-10-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-4-2025; https://t.me/yurasumy/23718
[56] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37756;
[57] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37767
[58] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25898; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25895
[59] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94538
[60] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25915; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25898; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25895; https://t.me/wargonzo/27506; https://t.me/dva_majors/74172
[61] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30455
[62] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1938096190987366812; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1938098278807310442; https://t.me/ASPIDGroup/172; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9469; https://t.me/b4_101/144
[63] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94538; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65445
[64] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25915; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25898; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25895; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65445; https://armyinform.com.ua/2025/06/26/dronova-poshta-praczyuye-na-toreczkomu-napryamku-vorog-bye-po-logistychnym-marshrutam/
[65] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37721; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37772
[66] https://t.me/dva_majors/74172 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/23723; https://t.me/yurasumy/23724 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37772 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30463 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65444 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25915 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25898 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25895 ;
[67] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1051737-maskuvanna-ratue-zitta-armia-rf-zastosovue-taktiku-malih-grup-i-fpv-droni-na-pokrovskomu-napramku-32-ombr/
[68] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WY8sDvZdWEA ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/26/vyglyadalo-smishno-zaraz-vzhe-ne-do-smihu-poblyzu-pokrovska-postijnyj-ruh-rosijskyh-shturmovykiv/
[69] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/26/drony-gnuchkoyi-zbirky-yak-rozvidnyky-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-adaptuyut-bezpilotnyky/
[70] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37772
[71] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37735
[72] https://t.me/dva_majors/74180
[73] https://t.me/osintpen/1302; https://t.me/baykalkaspiy/296
[74] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37721; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37772; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30446; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65438
[75] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25915; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25898; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25895; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/6543; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37721; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1052009-jdut-aktivni-boi-situacia-v-novosergiivci-ta-sevcenku-dani-osuv-hortica/
[76] https://t.me/tass_agency/322569;https://t.me/mod_russia/54171 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/54169
[77] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-24-2025
[78] https://t.me/voin_dv/15687
[79] https://t.me/voin_dv/15688
[80] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65448; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65446; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37745
[81] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65448; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25915; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25898; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/258
[82] https://t.me/mod_russia/54174 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/54170; https://t.me/tass_agency/322586 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/54172; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-21-2025
[83] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94552; https://t.me/voin_dv/15677; https://t.me/mod_russia/54174 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/54170; https://t.me/tass_agency/322586 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/54172; https://t.me/voin_dv/15681; https://t.me/voin_dv/15685
[84] https://t.me/wargonzo/27506
[85] https://t.me/voin_dv/15679
[86] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25898 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25895 ;
[87] https://t.me/vrogov/20861
[88] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25898 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25895
[89] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/26/rozkryty-prapor-pid-dron-na-zaporizhzhi-vorozhyh-shturmovykiv-vidpravlyayut-vmyraty-dlya-propagandy/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-mwW_smfVas
[90] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25915 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25898 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25895
[91] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/26/mriye-forsuvaty-oskil-ta-bigaye-lisamy-protyvnyk-demonstruye-vidnosnu-stabilnist/
[92] https://t.me/kpszsu/37063;
[93] https://www.facebook.com/don.gp.gov.ua/posts/pfbid02kfBeR3u4AXtVD3932VytReEHaooCPrCFeQLfEr6PnNGAkhQavbo4aSsgc9qLoUENl; https://suspilne dot media/1051705-u-pare-pidpisali-stvorenna-spectribunalu-za-zlocini-rf-britania-nadast-ukraini-350-raket-dla-ppo-1219-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1750916242&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://t.me/synegubov/15280
[94] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9453; https://t.me/channel24_ua/178059
